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Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A
Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test
Since the development of the first electro-mechanical com-
puting device less than forty years ago, the computer industry
has grown and evolved with phenomenal speed. Microcom-
puters and mass-marketed software' for personal computers
are two of the most recent innovations in the computer field.2
Concurrent with the increased profitability of mass-marketed
software,3 illicit copying ("pirating") of computer programs has
become inexpensive, easy, and prevalent. 4 As a result,
software manufacturers are turning to the copyright laws for
protection.5
Though courts now generally agree that copyright protec-
tion extends to most forms of software, they lack a workable
standard for determining when infringement of copyrights in
computer programs has occurred. The judicial standard used
1. Software is easiest to define as everything that is not hardware. Hard-
ware is defined as the "[p]hysical equipment used in data processing." ScI-
ENCE RESEARCH Assoc. INC., DATA PROCESSING GLOSSARY 127 (1979). Software
generally comprises three classes of subject matter: computer programs, data
bases, and documentation. Bender, Licensing and Protecting Computer
Software via Patents and Trade Secrets, in I SoFTWARE PROTECTION AND MAR-
KETING: COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND DATA BASES; VIDEO GAMES AND MOTION PIC-
TURES 619, 621 (1983). All forms of computer programs are software. See P.
SEIPEL, COMPUTING LAw 351 app. (1977). For the purposes of this Note, the
terms software and computer program are used interchangeably.
2. Two and one-half million microcomputers were sold in 1982. A Feverish
Race in Operating Systems, Bus. WK., Feb. 21, 1983, at 96. Personal microcom-
puter sales alone are predicted to reach 50 million units by 1985. To Each His
Own Computer, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1982, at 50. Software sales by U.S. com-
puter companies grossed $14.9 billion in 1982 and are anticipated to reach $39.1
billion in 1986. U.S. DEP'T OF COM., HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES: PROFILES
AND OUTLOOKS, THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 15 (1983). An estimated one million
computer programs are created each year. Castillo, Bill Safeguards Data Pro-
grams, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1980, at D1, col. 3.
3. Mass-marketed software for microcomputers in the United States
grossed over $1 billion in 1982 and sales are forecasted to reach $9 billion by
1988. Software Rentals: Piracy is the Hot New Issue, Bus. WK, Aug. 1, 1983, at
90, 91.
4. Piracy of personal computer programs has been estimated to drain $500
million in annual sales from software companies. Id. at 90.
5. Registrations of computer programs at the copyright office numbered
4000 in 1982. Moore, Report from the Copyright Office: Computerized Filing Sys-
tem Provides On-Line Access to Registration, PTC NEWSLETTER, Winter 1983, at
4,4.
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to infer illicit copying in all media other than computer
software, the substantial similarity test, focuses on aesthetic
similarities as viewed by an ordinary observer. The few courts
that have had to decide whether a program constituted an illicit
copy of an original computer program, however, have either ig-
nored the substantial similarity test altogether, or stated that
they were applying the test and then ignored its standards.
These courts have at least implicitly recognized that the sub-
stantial similarity test in its present form is of limited utility
when applied to computer programs.
This Note argues for an "iterative"6 approach to the sub-
stantial similarity test in the computer software copyright field.
Because recent developments in copyright protection of com-
puter software center on mass-marketed software,7 this Note
emphasizes such programs, designed for personal use. To aid
in understanding the issues involved in copyright protection of
computer programs, Part I describes the rudiments of software
and computer technology. Part II then examines the scope of
copyright protection for computer software and the definition
of an infringing copy. Part II traces the development of the
substantial similarity test from its initial application by courts
to theatrical plays, literature, and other aesthetic media to its
current use (and nonuse) for computer programs. Part IV ana-
lyzes the reluctance of courts to apply the substantial similar-
ity test to copyrighted computer programs as well as the
problems inherent in its application to computer programs. Fi-
nally, Part V proposes a modification of the substantial similar-
ity test that will take account of the differences between
software and the more traditional media, and also promote the
policies of copyright law.
6. In this Note, an "iterative" reproduction is defined as a restatement in
substantially the same form (i.e. a literal copy or translation) of a substantial
portion of the copyrighted work. The term "iterative" reproduction has been
applied in terms of fair use analysis to second order technology. See Note, To-
ward a Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement for an Advanced Technologi-
cal Era, 96 HARv. L. REV. 450 (1982). In that Note, "iterative" reproduction was
defined as copying "for the purpose of simply reasserting (in substantially the
same form) all or part of the contents of the original." Id. at 462. The definition
used in the present Note differs slightly from that definition, although the basic
idea is the same.
7. All of the copyright cases involving computer programs cited in this
Note dealt with mass-marketed software. Further, software that is not sold to
the general public often receives protection under trade secret law, thus mak-
ing copyright protection essentially superfluous. See generally Root, Protecting
Computer Software in the 'S0s: Practical Guidelines for Evolving Needs, 8 RuT.
COMPUTER & TEcH. L.J. 205, 226-27 (1981).
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I. TECHNOLOGY OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Many of the problems courts encounter in resolving claims
of infringement of computer software result from a misunder-
standing of the technology.8 In order to analyze the substantial
similarity test, a basic knowledge of the different versions and
functions of software as well as the storage devices is
necessary.9
First, computer programs10 may be expressed in either
source code or object code." Computer programmers usually
will first write a program in one of the standard higher-level
computer languages, such as FORTRAN12 or COBOL.13 These
semi-English forms of a program are types of source code.14
Because computers cannot process commands expressed in
8. See Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30
EMORY L.J. 483, 485 (1981). For example, one court has held that a computer
program communicates with the computer, not the user, and therefore copy-
right protection was denied. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
545 F. Supp. 812, 824-25 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). The computer, however, only deals in voltages,
currents, and magnetic domains, with the program being a symbolic represen-
tation of the path of that current. Thus, any computer program is designed for
human intelligibility, not to instruct the computer. See Brooks, Agreements
with Consultants and Employees and Registering Copyrights in Computer
Software, in COMPUTER LAw 1982: ACQUIRING COMPUTER GOODS AND SERVICES
150-51 (1982).
9. For a more detailed explanation of the operation of computers, see
Koenig, Software Copyright: The Conflict within CONTU, 27 BULT. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y U.SJ.A. 340 (1980).
10. The Copyright Act defines a computer program as "a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). This definition implies that a
computer program must be written as a statement or instruction in order to
qualify for copyright protection. A better definition of a computer program,
which avoids this implication, is a "specification of the sequence of computa-
tional steps" used in a computer. A. RALSTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER
SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 1219 (2d ed. 1983).
11. For a more detailed, but still basic, description of the various codes and
their use in the computer, see J. O'BRIEN, COMPUTERS IN BUSINESS MANAGE-
MENT 246-54 (3d ed. 1982).
12. FORTRAN (FORmula TRANslation), developed in 1957, is the oldest
source code language and is used primarily by scientists and mathematicians.
Id. at 254.
13. COBOL (Common Business Oriented Language) is used primarily for
business data processing. Id. at 257.
14. The term source code also encompasses assembly languages, which are
alphanumeric forms of expression and are not as easily understandable to
humans as the higher-level languages. See A. RALSTON, supra note 10, at 1385.
The relationship between computer languages and codes may be better illus-
trated by a noncomputer analogy. Source code is the term used to describe a
form of communication, as alphabetical representations describe a manner of
communicating for humans. A high-level computer language, such as FOR-
TRAN, is a type of source code in the same manner as English is a type of al-
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these semi-English languages, a translating program, known as
a compiler or an assembler, must convert the source code ver-
sion of a program into object code,' 5 the binary form16 of a pro-
gram. Each binary numeral's location,1 7 or bit,18 represents
either an open or closed electrical circuit in the computer, with
each grouping of eight bits commonly known as a byte.19 A
computer program, whether expressed in source code or object
code, can be copied quickly and inexpensively.20
In addition to being expressed in different codes, computer
programs can be stored in different media, usually either floppy
disks or silicon chips.2 1 A "floppy" is a small magnetic disk, re-
sembling a phonograph record, that may be written on, erased,
reprogrammed, and removed.22 Programs stored on floppies
can be expressed in source code and then be compiled into ob-
ject code by the computer immediately before performing the
program's functions. Silicon chips, on the other hand, are built
into the central processor 23 of the computer and consist of very
phabetical representaion. Object code is a different representation, similar to a
numerical representation.
15. An assembly program, or assembler, converts source code programs
into object code either inside the processing computer, or in the case of most
microcomputers, in a larger computer before mass-marketing of the program.
See id. at 124-27. A compiler serves basically the same function as an assem-
bler except that it can call in other routines stored in a computer and incorpo-
rate them into the program, whereas an assembler merely translates a program
into object code. See A. CHANDOR, THE FACTS ON FILE DICTIoNARY OF
MICROCOMPUTERS 17, 44 (1981).
16. Binary form is simply a base 2 numerical system. All of the digits of a
binary number are either O's or l's, corresponding in a computer to either an
open or a closed circuit. See generally J. BoYcE., MICROPROCESSOR AND
MICROCOMP ER BASICS 35-49 (1979).
17. A "location" is the memory cell or circuit where an individual piece of
information in object code is stored within the silicon chip. P. BURTON, A DIC-
TIONARY OF IINICOMPUTING AND MICROCOMPUTING 153 (1982).
18. A bit, since it is in binary form, can only have the value of a 0 or a 1.
Id. at 27.
19. Although computer words and bytes are not synonymous, the size of a
microcomputer word generally is the same as a byte, or eight bits. See L.
HOHENSTEIN, COMPUTER PERIPHERALS FOR MINICOMPUTERS, MICROPROCESSORS,
AND PERSONAL COMPUTERS 17 (1980). Amusingly, a four bit computer word,
sometimes referred to as a byte, is now commonly referred to as a "nibble." A.
CHANDoR, supra note 15, at 128; P. BURTON, supra note 17, at 40.
20. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 783
(C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 721 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
21. Computer programs can also be represented on other media, such as
coding sheets or keypunch cards. Bender, supra note 1, at 627. The most com-
mon storage devices for microcomputer programs, however, are floppy disks
and silicon chips.
22. See J. O'BRIEN, supra note 11, at 126.
23. A central processor, or CPU, contains the circuits that control the exe-
cution of a computer program. Id. at 654.
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small rectangular chips that store programs in integrated cir-
cuits.24 A chip stores a computer program permanently and
cannot be reprogrammed without extensive work.25 In addi-
tion, programs stored in silicon chips are always expressed in
object code inside the chip26 and thus need not be compiled by
the operating computer.
Finally, computer programs function either as operating
programs or as application programs. Operating programs di-
rect the basic processes of the computer, such as the sign-on
procedure or the translation of source code programs.27 These
programs are usually stored in silicon chips inside the com-
puter (and thus are only fixed in object code) since the same
basic processes directed by operating programs are essential to
any operation of the computer.2 8 The majority of programs,
however, are application programs, which perform special func-
tions such as word *processing, budget planning, or balance
sheet bookkeeping.29 These most often are stored on floppy
disks and therefore can be expressed in source code.30 Virtu-
ally all mass-marketed microcomputer programs, however,
whether operating programs or application programs, are mar-
keted in object code.3 1
II. SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Copyright protection has emerged as the primary tool to
safeguard a programmer's proprietary interest in mass-mar-
keted computer software. 32 Because copyright laws have only
24. Id. at 82. The chips contained in a microcomputer are generally
"smaller than an Oreo cookie." J. Wnus & M. MILLER, COMPUTERS FOR EVERY-
BODY 78 (1981).
25. See J. O'BRIEN, supra note 11, at 160.
26. Id. at 82.
27. See generally M. DA-MKE, MICROCOMPUTER OPERATING SYSTEMS 9-13
(1982).
28. The operating program's purpose is to act as an intermediary between
the user of the program and the hardware. Id. at 1; see also A. RALSTON, supra
note 10, at 1134.
29. J. O'BRIEN, supra note 11, at 158-59.
30. Id. at 158.
31. Occassionally a program written in BASIC will be marketed in its high-
level language code; however, this is an extremely rare occurrence. See D.
REMER, LEGAL CARE FOR YOUR SOFrwARE: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE FOR COM-
PUTER SOFTWARE WRrrERS 39 (1982). One of the reasons that programmers will
market only their object code is to maintain trade secret protection for their
source code. Id.
32. There are three other potential forms of proprietary protection for com-
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recently been interpreted to extend to computer software, 33
courts are still struggling in their efforts to apply copyright
principles to the industry's complex technological advances. 34
With the recent proliferation of computer copyright litigation,3 5
puter software: patent, trade secret, and contract law. All three are of little
utility in the mass-marketed microcomputer field.
Patents are available only for new innovations that are novel and unobvi-
ous to the average person in the field. Most microcomputer programs do not
involve new processes or inventions, but merely apply the existing technology
in a new manner to a particular problem. Thus, computer programs face diffi-
culty in satisfying the "novelty" requirement for a patent. See, e.g., Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591-94 (1978) (improved method of calculation is unpaten-
able); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (computer program that con-
verted base ten numbers to binary numbers held unpatentable). But see
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-87 (1981) (holding a process for molding
rubber patentable even though embodied in a computer program). Copyright
law, on the other hand, only requires a "modicum of creativity" in the work to
be protected. See Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); see also Gemigniani, Legal Protec-
tion for Computer Software: The View From '79, RUT. J. COMPUTER L. & TECH.
269, 293-94 (1980) (practical problems in administering patents for software fur-
ther reduce their attractiveness).
Trade secret protection, although it has been the primary method of pro-
tecting nonmass-marketed software, is useless in protecting the object code of
a mass-marketed computer program. Protection as a trade secret requires con-
fidentiality in every dealing. Mass-marketing of software prevents the required
confidentiality. See Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive
Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 339, 396 (1983).
Finally, contract law's primary usefulness also lies in protecting software
that is not mass-marketed. Since it would be impractical for administrative
reasons to create an individually signed contract agreement with each pur-
chaser of mass-marketed software, package inserts are the only practical man-
ner of attempting to create a contract. Package inserts, however, which
resemble unilateral contracts, may be characterized as contracts of adhesion
and held unenforceable. Greguras, Protecting Computer Software by Contrac
SOFTWARE PROTECTION, Oct. 1983, at 1, 10. See also Root, supra note 7, at 228.
33. The Register of Copyrights announced on May 19, 1964 that computer
software would be accepted for copyright deposit and registration. See Copy-
right Regulations for Computer Programs, 11 BUL. CoPYRiGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 361
(1964). The first computer program copyright was registered in 1964 to John F.
Banzhaf III for a law research program. I N. HENRY, COPYRIGHT, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY PUBLIc PouIcY 74 (1975). The first case to imply that copyright
protection extended to a computer program was Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.,
v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Although the issue
before the court was whether machine-readable answer sheets could be copy-
righted, the court analogized to computer programs and held that the answer
sheets could be copyrighted. Id. at 525. For a thorough discussion of the pro-
cess of acquiring copyright protection, see Root, supra note 7, at 205.
34. Congress, as well as the judiciary, is hard pressed to keep current on
computer developments. See Holder, Have Your Computer Call My Computer,
STUDENT LAw., Nov. 1983, at 28, 30.
35. The number of cases dealing with copyright infringement of computer
programs has grown enormously since the first such case, Synercom Technol-
ogy, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978), was
decided in 1978. See cases cited infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
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however, a judicial consensus is beginning to form on the exist-
ence of copyright protection for computer programs. 3 6
A. EXISTENCE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER
PROGRAMS
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides protection for "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device."37 Although
courts recognized that computer programs written in source
code fit within these requirements,38 they were somewhat re-
luctant to place other types of computer programs within the
ambit of the copyright laws.3 9 By proposing explicit amend-
ments to the Copyright Act, the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU),40 at-
tempted to clarify that copyright protection extended to all
forms of computer programs.41 Congress enacted CONTU's
36. See generally 1 M. NnmmER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04[C] (1983)
(discussion of the judicial trend in providing copyright protection for computer
programs).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
38. Although the courts never decided before the 1980 amendments
whether source code programs were protected, such protection was, prior to
that time, described as "beyond question." See Maggs, Some Problems of Legal
Protection of Programs for Microcomputer Control Systems, 1979 U. ILL. L.F.
453, 459-60. Even before the amendments, a programmer could register a FOR-
TRAN program for a copyright as a literary work. See M. Nimmer, supra note
36, at § 2.04[C].
39. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F.
Supp. 812, 821-22 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding object code form of program not copy-
rightable), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690
(1984); Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066-67
n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (copyright protection extends "to computer programs in
their flow chart, source and assembly phases but not in their object phase")
(dictum), affd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980); see generally Ap-
ple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. at 817-20 (discuss-
ing the split among the courts on the extent of copyright protection).
40. Congress established the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) in 1975 to study the problems of photo-
copying and computer programs as they relate to copyright protection. See NA-
TIONAL COMIUSSION ON NEW TEcNOLOGIcAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CONTU REPORT].
41. CONTU proposed two changes to the Copyright Act of 1976 relating to
computer programs. First, it proposed adding a definition of "computer pro-
gram" to § 101 of the Act. See supra note 10. Second, it proposed replacing the
then existing § 117 with a new section allowing a rightful owner of a copy of a
copyrighted program to make a copy of the program provided that the produc-
tion of the copy is essential to operation of the program (i.e., reading a program
off a floppy into the internal storage of a computer) or the new copy is solely
1270 [Vol. 68:1264
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recommendations, verbatim, in 1980.42
Even after the 1980 amendments, however, three forms of
software have faced difficulties in meeting the statutory re-
quirements for copyright protection. Specifically, courts have
questioned whether the object code form of a program is an en-
gineering process and thus not a work of authorship;43 whether
a program stored in a silicon chip is computer hardware and
thus not a fixed literary work 44 and whether an operating pro-
gram is a utilitarian engineering process and thus neither a
work of authorship nor a medium of expression. 45
More recently, however, courts have generally interpreted
the statutory guidelines and CONTU's expression of intent sur-
rounding the 1980 amendments4 6 to provide copyright protec-
tion to all forms of computer programs. 47 The Third Circuit, in
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,48 recently
used for archival purposes (i.e., storing a back-up copy of a program). CONTU
REPORT, supra note 40, at 12.
42. An Act to Amend the Patent and Trademark Laws, Pub. L. No. 96-517,
§ 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)).
43. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. 545 F. Supp. 812,
821-22 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S.
Ct. 690 (1984); see also CONTU REPORT, supra note 40, at 28-30 (dissent of Com-
missioner Hersey arguing that expression must be directed to a human audi-
ence, and object code only communicates with the computer).
44. See Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1069
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (holding that a Read Only Memory Chip (ROM) is not a copy of
a copyrighted computer program since it is not fixed), affd on other grounds,
628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
45. Although no court has expressly denied protection based on the oper-
ating/application program distinction, it has been raised in a number of cases.
See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1250-52; Ap-
ple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 780 (C.D. CaL 1983);
GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718, 719-20 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Tandy Corp. v.
Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
46. Because Congress passed CONTT's recommendations without change,
the CONTU report is viewed as part of the legislative history of copyright pro-
tection of computer programs. See H.R. REP. No. 1307, pt. I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
23, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6460, 6482.
47. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at
1247-48; Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 749-51 (N.D. IM. 1983); Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 778-82; Hubco Data Prods. Corp.
v. Management Assistance Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,529, at 18,103-
06 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983).
Only two courts have specifically stated that a form of a computer program
is not copyrightable. Neither case, however, has been upheld on that issue by
the circuit court reviewing the case. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 824-25 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A
Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066-67 nA (N.D. Ill. 1979) (dictum), affid on other
grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
48. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
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addressed the aforementioned barriers to copyright protection
of an operating program fixed in object code in a silicon chip.
The court rejected all three of the arguments, 49 implying that a
computer program in any form, written on any recording device
and serving any computer purpose is copyrightable.5 0 Thus,
the Third Circuit joined a growing number of courts in ex-
panding copyright protection for computer programs.5 '
B. INFRINGEMENT OF A COPYRIGHT IN COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Although the Copyright Act grants the owner of a copy-
righted work five exclusive rights in the work,5 2 the right to
reproduce copies has provided virtually the sole protection for
the computer programmer's interests. 3 The owner of a valid
copyright in a computer program seeking to prove that the ex-
clusive right of reproduction has been infringed must prove (1)
that the defendant has produced a "fixed" work within the
meaning of section 101 of the Act,54 and (2) that the alleged
copy has appropriated the "expression" of the copyrighted
program.55
49. Id. at 1246-54.
50. Id. at 1246-48. The Third Circuit in Apple, although not stating a broad
holding, agreed with the opinion in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc.,
562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984), which stated:
"Any doubt as to whether the Copyright Act as presently worded protects com-
puter programs of all types, however fixed, is removed by examining the legis-
lative history of the 1980 Act and particularly the work of CONTU." Id. at 781;
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d at 1252.
51. See cases cited supra note 47 and accompanying text.
52. Copyright protection grants to the owner the rights to reproduce the
copyrighed work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, publicly perform
the work, and display the work publicly. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
53. The derivative works protection is the only other doctrine that has
been applied in a computer copyright context. In Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l,
Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983), the court held that
silicon chips that were to be substituted for the original chips in a video game
constituted a derivative work of the copyrighted audiovisual program. Id. at
1013-14. The Midway decision is not directly applicable to computer programs,
however, because the holding is confined to infringement of the audiovisual
copyright of the video game, not the underlying computer program. Id. at 1012.
One commentator has suggested that the exclusive right to perform a copy-
righted work also adds protection for the owner of a copyright in a computer
program. See Prasinos, World-Wide Protection of Computer Programs by Copy-
right, 4 RUTGERS J. Comp. & LAw 42, 67 (1974).
54. The word "copies" is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) which provides
the "fixation" requirement.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). The idea/expression dichotomy was placed
in the copyright laws by the 1976 Copyright Act. The inclusion was intended
"to restate ... that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains
unchanged." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5670.
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The requirement that an alleged copy be "fixed" is the
same as the "fixed" requirement for attaining copyright protec-
tion.56 The alleged copy must be fixed in a material object
"from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device."57 Since the 1980 Amendments, it has become rela-
tively clear that a program in the internal memory of a com-
puter is "fixed", even though the work is merely temporarily
stored and will be erased when the power is turned off.58
Whereas the "fixed" requirement lends itself to an objec-
tive test, the decision whether an alleged copy appropriates the
expression of a copyrighted work requires a more subjective,
unprincipled determination. The copyright laws, unlike the
patent laws, do not protect the idea behind the work but
merely protect the manner of expressing the idea.59 Thus, a
copyright on a blueprint of a house does not prevent another
56. Just as an author's work must be fixed to qualify for copyright protec-
tion, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982), so must a work be fixed to qualify as a "copy" of
the copyrighted program, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definiton of "copies").
58. Hubco Data Prod. v. Management Assistance, Inc., COPYRIGH'r L. REP.
(CCH) 1 25,529, at 18,105 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983). Further, the duplication of a
silicon chip containing a program results in the creation of a fixed copy. See
Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 174-75 (N.D.
Cal. 1981); see also 2 M. NDMER, supra note 36, at § 8.08 (arguing that the 1980
amendments, by including works that may be perceived "with the aid of a
machine" in the definition of copy, clarified that unauthorized input of a com-
puter program into any storage device constitutes an infringing act); CONTU
REPORT, supra note 40, at 12 ("[T]he placement of any copyrighted work into a
computer is the preparation of a copy and, therefore, a potential infringement
of copyright.").
59. Patent protection extends beyond the expression of the covered work
to the "means of reducing an inventive idea to practice." Dymow v. Bolton, 11
F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926).
The legislative history regarding 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) indicates that copyright
protection of computer programs covers "the expression adopted by the
programmer ... and that the actual process or methods embodied in the pro-
gram are not within the scope of copyright law." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note
55, at 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 5670. In addition, if
the idea of the copyright is so narrow that the subject requires a very limited
range of expressions, the idea and expression are said to merge and literal
copying of the expression does not infringe the copyright. Morrissey v. Proctor
& Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (lst Cir. 1967). Thus, a copyright in a law-
yer's form is not infringed by literal copying when the language it contains may
be expressed in a very limited number of ways to accomplish the same pur-
pose. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 705-06 (2d Cir.
1958). CONTU indicated that the Morrissey doctrine should be applied to com-
puter programs, CONTU REPORT, supra note 40, at 20, and the Third Circuit
held that the doctrine was applicable to computer programs. See Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
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builder from constructing the dwelling pictured, the copyright
only protects against reproducing the actual blueprint.60 The
distinction between the expression of a copyrighted work and
the idea behind the work is incapable of being drawn with a
precise line in many cases.6 ' For example, a play that dupli-
cated Romeo and Juliet's famous dialogue has obviously appro-
priated the expression of the play; however, if the "pirating"
play consisted of essentially the same plot set in a different
time period with some specific similarities to Romeo and Juliet,
the determination of whether it appropriated Shakespeare's ex-
pression or his ideas would become more difflcult.62 Instead of
viewing an alleged copy as simply appropriating either the ex-
pression or the idea, the distinction is better envisioned as a
continuum, progressing gradually from appropriating pure
ideas to appropriating the expression word for word.6 3 The
middle "gray" area is partly expression and partly idea, making
it difficult to draw the line between infringing and noninfring-
ing uses of the copyrighted work.
The copyright laws, by distinguishing between an idea and
its expression, attempt to strike a balance between the compet-
ing goals of protection of works and free dissemination of
ideas.6 4 This balance must be struck to further the stated pur-
pose of the copyright laws: "To Promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts."65 The copyright laws were designed to
give authors a limited monopoly,6 6 the primary goal of which is
60. Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972).
61. Judge Learned Hand, in one of his earliest opinions on the subject,
stated that the line between expression and idea, "wherever it is drawn, will
seem arbitrary." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir.
1930).
62. The characteristics ascribed to a "pirating" play are found in West Side
Story, which bears a resemblence to Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet. Nimmer
argues that West Side Story could be classified as infringing the expression of
Romeo and Juliet, see 3 M. Nnmmi, supra note 36, at § 13.03 [A] [11, while other
commentators, using a different test argue that it merely appropriates Shake-
speare's ideas, see Knowles & Palnieri, Dissecting Krofft: An Expression of
New Ideas in Copyright?, 8 SAN FERN. V.L. REv. 109, 152-66 (1980).
63. See Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 62, at 126.
64. 'The guiding consideration in drawing the line [between idea and ex-
pression] is the preservation of the balance between competition and protec-
tion reflected in the patent and copyright laws." Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
65. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
66. CONTU REPORT, supra note 40, at 16. See generally R. POSNER, Eco-
No c ANALYsis Of LAw § 13.6 (2d ed. 1977) (comparing copyright protection
with monopoly and arguing that the protection should be limited.)
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wide dissemination of authors' ideas.67 Without copyright pro-
tection, it is argued, authors would have little to gain by mar-
keting their works; a pirate could immediately copy the work
and sell it for less than the original.68 Thus, some proprietary
protection is necessary to achieve an economic incentive to cre-
ate new works. The policy in favor of dissemination requires
that protection be limited merely to that which is necessary to
achieve this incentive to create.6 9 Prohibiting the further use of
the idea in a copyrighted work would not only narrow the
range of artistic endeavors,70 but would also prevent most of
the cumulative innovation that results from building on knowl-
edge.7 1 Therefore, the copyright laws prohibit the unproductive
use of a protected work (copying the expression), but allow the
economically and artistically beneficial use (copying the idea).
M. USE (AND NONUSE) OF THE SUBSTANTIAL
SIMILARITY TEST
The most obvious method of attempting to prove copying in
any medium is to show that the defendant transcribed the work
verbatim. Plaintiffs, however, would face tremendous difficulty
in winning a copyright infringement action if they were re-
quired to prove literal copying. Because independent creation
of the copyrighted work does not infringe the copyright,72 the
67. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
68. This is especially true for computer programs because the cost of a lit-
eral reproduction of a computer program is far smaller than the cost of develop-
ing a computer program. See J. SoMA, THE COmpUTER INDusTRY 120 (1976).
69. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 40, at 16.
70. Lord Mansfield stated the basic conflict in 1785 when he wrote:
[W] e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial;
the one that men of ability, who have employed their time for the serv-
ice of the community may not be deprived of their just merits, and the
reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not
be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded.
Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (1785).
71. See, e.g., Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. 124, 131 (E.D.
Mich. 1979) ("[W]ith respect to the useful arts, there is a societal interest in
having many offer the art in the marketplace. Our economy functions best
under competition. And, if many can present variants on the copyrighted mate-
rial, we hope that advances in its teaching will result."); see also Chafee, Re-
flections on the Law of Copyright 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511 (1945) ("Progress
would be stifled if the author had a complete monopoly of everything in his
book....").
72. Since the copyright protects the expression and not the idea, anyone
may create an identical work as long as he or she does not use the copyrighted
work in preparing the identical work. See Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F.
145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
Independent creation in this context refers to producing a work identical
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plaintiff, to prove literal copying, would have to show not only
that the alleged copy is the same as the copyrighted work, but
also that the defendant literally transcribed the copyrighted
work in preparing the alleged copy. Because pirates are un-
likely to be obvious about their copying,7 3 proof of the direct
use of the copyrighted work in preparing a copy is virtually
impossible.74
This problem of proof, as well as the difficulty in determin-
ing whether the expression rather than the idea of a work has
been appropriated, led courts to the development of the sub-
stantial similarity test for all copyright actions.7 5 The test ac-
complishes two interrelated functions: (1) it shifts the burden
of persuasion on the issue of use of the copyrighted work to the
defendant after the plaintiff has shown similarities between the
works,76 and (2) it provides a guide to determine whether the
expression or the idea of the copyrighted work has been
appropriated.77
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TEST
The principal beginnings of the present substantial similar-
ity test are found in Learned Hand's opinion in Nichols v. Uni-
versal Pictures Co.78 To illustrate how to determine whether
the play "The Cohens and the Kelleys" infringed the expres-
or substantially similar to a copyrighted work without basing the work on the
copyrighted work. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
73. Especially with mass-marketed works, a potential pirate would have
numerous opportunities to view a work and copy it without the copyright
owner's knowledge. The actual copying may occur in private.
74. See, e.g., Blumcraft v. Newman Bros., 373 F.2d 905, 906-07 (6th Cir. 1967).
75. For a description of the difficulty in proving copying, see id. at 907. For
an analysis of the idea/expression problem and its relationship to the substan-
tial similarity test, see Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 45 F.2d 119, 121-23 (2d
Cir. 1930).
76. See Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 721 (9th
Cir. 1976). Courts have held that it is clearly erroneous to find for the defend-
ant when the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of substantial similar-
ity and no countervailing evidence of independent creation has been presented
by the defendant. See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106,
1110-11 (9th Cir. 1970); R. Dakin & Co. v. Charles Offset Co., 441 F. Supp. 434,
438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
77. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
78. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). Tests resembling the substantial similarity
test were used prior to Judge Hand's decision. See Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290
F. 959, 960 (2d Cir. 1923) ('To constitute an infringement of the appellant's com-
position, it would be necessary to find a substantial copying of a substantial
and material part of it."); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 625 (D. Mass. 1845)
(No. 4436).
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sion of the play "Abie's Irish Rose," Judge Hand described a se-
ries of abstractions of the copyrighted work. He began with the
general theme of the play, and then successively added detail
from the play so that the abstraction more closely resembled a
literal duplication of the script.7 9 Drawing an exact line be-
tween abstractions that appropriate the expression and ones
that merely use the ideas was impossible, according to Judge
Hand.80 Instead, Judge Hand stated that the work should be
viewed as a whole, without expert testimony on the issue of
similarities,81 and the factflnder must draw the inevitably arbi-
trary line based "upon the firmer, if more naive, ground of its
considered impressions upon its own perusal."82
Although Judge Hand's "abstractions" test has since un-
dergone modification, the basic test for substantial similarity
remains. The Ninth Circuit, in Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer,8 3
emphasized that the substantial similarity determination is to
be made from the vantage point of an "ordinary observer."84
Unless an ordinary observer would consider the alleged copy to
be substantially similar to the protected work, the "pirate" has
not infringed the copyright.85 Other courts have referred to the
standard as an "audience" test, in which the factfinder should
view the work as the actual audience of the work would view it,
not just as any ordinary observer would view it.86 In either
case, expert testimony and detailed dissection of the work to
show similarities are useless because the reaction of the ordi-
nary observer or audience is to be "spontaneous and immedi-
79. 45 F.2d at 120-21.
80. Id. at 121.
81. In Nichols, Judge Hand chastised the attorneys for their lengthy pres-
entation of expert evidence regarding specific similarities between the two
plays. Judge Hand expressed the hope that "such evidence may in the future
be entirely excluded." Id. at 123.
82. Id. Judge Hand concluded that the two plays were not substantially
similar and therefore the infringement action was dismissed. Id.
83. 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933).
84. Id. at 19. In subsequent cases, it is interesting to note the different
ways courts refer to this standard. It has been termed the ordinary observer
test, the ordinary reasonable person test, and the ordinary lay hearer test.
There appear to be no differences among these tests beyond their labels.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp.,
672 F.2d 607, 619 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982) (applying the audi-
ence test). At least one commentator has suggested that the audience test pro-
vides a better standard because it views the similarities from the point of view
of the actual observers, thus better estimating the probable economic effect of
the "pirate" on the copyrighted work's market. See Note, Copyright Infringe-
ment Actions: The Proper Role for Audience Reactions in Determining Substan-
tial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L REv. 385, 396 (1981).
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ate."87 Simply put, the trier of fact should view the two works
as any observer or audience would and decide intuitively
whether the expression was appropriated.
More recently, courts have added a preliminary level of in-
quiry to Learned Hand's "abstractions" test. The courts first in-
quire whether the defendant had access to the copyrighted
work, or, in other words, whether the defendant had an oppor-
tunity to view the work.88 If so, courts next use the ordinary
observer test to determine whether substantial similarity ex-
ists. If, on the other hand, there is no reasonable probability of
access, 89 courts use the more stringent "striking similarity"
test. Under that test, copying will be inferred only if the simi-
larities are so striking that they "preclude the possibility of in-
dependent creation."90 Both the substantial similarity test and
the striking similarity test rely on the ordinary observer to view
the similarities without the use of expert testimony.91
In Arnstein v. Porter92 the Second Circuit enunciated a dif-
ferent two-step substantial similarity test. Under the Arnstein
approach the factfinder first determines whether the defendant
used the plaintiff's work in preparing the alleged copy 93 by
87. Harold Lloyd Corp., 65 F.2d at 18. As explained in Frankel v. Irwin, 34
F.2d 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1918), the introduction of expert testimony leads to "the clas-
sic difficulty of not being able to see the forest for the trees." Id. at 144.
88. Access has been considered by some courts to be synonymous with ac-
tual viewing and knowledge of the copyrighted work. See Bradbury v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 287 F.2d 478, 479 (9th Cir. 1961); Christie v. Harris, 47
F. Supp. 39, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). The more generally accepted definition of ac-
cess, however, is the opportunity to view the copyrighted work. See Smith v.
Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd, 360 F.2d 928 (2d
Cir. 1966). See also 3 M. NnvMER, supra note 36, at § 13.02[A] (arguing for de-
fining access as having the opportunity to view the copyrighted work).
89. The plaintiff cannot satisfy the access requirement by merely showing
a "bare possibility" of access, there must be a "reasonable possibility" that the
defendant had the opportunity to view the copyrighted work. Testa v. Janssen,
492 F. Supp. 198, 202-03 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
90. See Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir.
1978); see also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 36, at § 13.01 [A].
91. The striking similarity test increases the burden on the plaintiff to
show more similarities, but does not fundamentally change the underlying test.
See Ferguson, 584 F.2d at 113.
92. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
93. The court in Arnstein phrased the first issue as whether the defendant
"copied" the copyrighted work. Id. at 468-69. The court applied the word "cop-
ied" not in its statutory sense, but rather to refer to the defendant's use of the
copyrighted work in preparing the alleged infringing work. Thus, one has "cop-
ied" a work if he or she has viewed the work and applied anything from the
work to the alleged infringing work. Id. In order to prevent confusion, this
Note will refer to Arnstein's first step as defendant's use of the copyrighted
work.
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showing a combination of access and similarities. 94 Expert evi-
dence and detailed dissection of the work are relevant to this
determination because the issue is merely whether the copy-
righted work was used in creating the alleged copy, not
whether the expression of the copyrighted work was appropri-
ated.95 If use of the copyrighted work is shown, the second step
consists of determining whether the defendant appropriated
the expression or the idea.96 Under this step, the Arnstein test
resembles the abstractions test in its use of the ordinary ob-
server standard to judge the similarities between the works.
Detailed dissection of the work and expert testimony become
irrelevant to this determination-the intuition of the ordinary
observer controls. 97
The Ninth Circuit, in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Produc-
tions v. McDonald's Corp. ,98 interpreted Arnstein as creating a
"bifurcated" test for showing substantial similarity.99 The
Ninth Circuit changed the first step of the Arnstein test into an
"extrinsic" 0 0 determination of whether the ideas of the alleged
copy resemble the ideas of the copyrighted work.101 The sub-
ject matter of the works, the materials used, and the type of
artwork created, among other things, must be examined to de-
termine whether the ideas are similar.102 Expert testimony and
94. The court in Arnstein emphasized that if the requisite similarities did
not exist between the works, then even the highest showing of access would
not result in a finding of infringement. Id. at 468.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. In Arnstein, the copyright issue concerned copying a musical com-
position. On a summary judgment motion by the defendant, the court held
that, although the plaintiff's story was improbable, summary judgment would
not be granted unless there was not the slightest doubt as to the facts. Id. at
469-70. This aspect of the Arnstein holding is no longer good law. See, e.g., First
Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-90 (1968). The two-step copy-
right infringement test of Arnstein, however, is still followed by some courts.
See, e.g., Ferguson, 584 F.2d at 1141.
98. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). For a detailed discussion of the Krofft
case, see Knowles & Palinieri, supra note 62, at 109.
99. Id. at 1164-65. Although the Krofft court stated that they were follow-
ing the Arnstein approach, they also noted that the precedential value of the
"bifurcated" test did not rely on whether their reading of Arnstein was correct.
Id. at 1165-66 n.7. It is clear that Krofft modified the Arnstein approach to some
extent.
100. The first step is labelled "extrinsic" because it depends not on the re-
sponses of the trier of fact, but on specific criteria that can be listed and ana-
lyzed. Thus, the relevant factors are extrinsic to the trier of fact. Id. at 1164.
101. Nimmer has characterized this "similarity in ideas" standard as loosen-
ing the first step of the Arnstein approach, since similar ideas will almost al-
ways be present, whereas "copying" requires an inference of use of the work
from the similarities. See 3 M. NuPm , supra note 36, at § 13.03[E] (3).
102. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
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detailed dissection of the works are appropriate to show these
similarities and the factfmder examines the specific criteria, not
as an ordinary lay observer, but as a trier of fact examining all
the expert and detailed evidence. 0 3 Assuming the plaintiff es-
tablishes general similarity between the ideas of the two works,
the court turns to the "intrinsic" aspect of the test, which dupli-
cates the Arnstein test by using the ordinary observer standard
and disallowing the use of expert testimony to show similari-
ties between the expressions of the two works. 0 4
It is tempting to overemphasize the contrasts between the
different versions of the substantial similarity test and ignore
their fundamental likenesses. Basically, courts apply either of
two approaches to determine substantial similarity: the "ab-
stractions" test, which first focuses on whether access to the
copyrighted work existed and then uses the standard of the or-
dinary observer to measure the extent of similarities in expres-
sion; or the Arnstein or "bifurcated" approach which first
determines whether the "pirate" used the copyrighted work
(or, in the Ninth Circuit under Krofft, whether the two works
contain the same ideas) and then, as in the "abstractions" test,
focuses on the ordinary observer to detect similarities in ex-
pression. Under either approach, expert evidence and detailed
dissection of the work are not relevant to show appropriation of
the expression because the ordinary observer is the focal point
of that inquiry.
B. USE AND NONUSE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL SIMInARTY TEST FOR
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
The few courts presented with a question of illicit copying
of a computer program have rarely mentioned the substantial
similarity test and never applied the test in substance.105 In
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Com-
pany, 10 6 University Computing Company (UCC), after viewing
103. Id.
104. Id. The second part of the test is described as "intrinsic" because it is
governed by the general observations and intuition of the ordinary observer
and not specific criteria. Id.
105. Only four federal cases have been presented with a question of in-
fringement of a copyrighted computer program where the issue of copying has
at all been challenged. See Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d
Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Hubco
Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
T 25,529 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Com-
puting Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
106. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
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Synercom's copyrighted computer program, engineered a pro-
gram containing Synercom's exact input formats. 0 7 The court
characterized UCC's procedure for producing the new program
as involving substantial work and creativity.108 Synercom, how-
ever, argued that UCC had illicitly copied the input formats
from the copyrighted program. Although the case clearly con-
tained a "copying" problem controlled by the substantial simi-
larity test,109 the court avoided any mention of the test or its
standards, and instead merely analyzed whether the idea or
the expression of the copyrighted formats had been appropri-
ated. 110 The court reasoned that the sequence and ordering of
data in an input format is an idea, much like the figure "H" pat-
tern of an automobile stick shift is an idea, not an expres-
sion." In the court's view, UCC had not copied Synercom's
expression, but had created "original expressions of the copied
107. An input format is a part of a computer program that specifies the or-
der and manner of inserting data into a program for execution. Id. at 1005.
108. Id. at 1013 n.5. As described by the court in Synercom, the defendants'
use of the copyrighted program resembled reverse engineering, which consists
of viewing the functioning of a computer program and creating a similar pro-
gram to accomplish the same results as the original. The defendants' purpose
in duplicating the input formats was to achieve compatability with Synercom's
computer hardware. See id. at 1012. Compatability refers to the ability of a
program to be run on a specific computer. A program is IBM compatible if it
matches with the operating system of the IBM computer so that the program
can be read by the computer. Obviously, some similarities are required to
make a program cimpatible.
109. As stated by the court in Synercom, the primary issue concerned
whether the defendants appropriated the expression or the idea of the copy-
righted program. Id. at 1013. As noted by Learned Hand in Nichols, the sub-
stantial similarity test is used to judge the idea/expression dichotomy. Nichols
v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
110. 462 F. Supp. at 1013.
111. Id. at 1013. The Synercom court held, alternatively, that the input for-
mats of the program were not copyrightable subject matter. Id. at 1014. Ac-
cording to the court, the test in determining whether the subject matter was
copyrightable was "whether the material proffered for copyright undertakes to
express." Id. at 1011. The Copyright Act, however, does not contain such a re-
quirement. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Instead, the Copyright
Act requires the material be "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). Certainly, the source code computer program is a me-
dium of expression and the input formats were fixed in the computer program,
thus satisfying the copyright requirements.
The Synercom court confused the existence of copyright protection with
the infringement question. Whether the input formats are an expression or an
idea is properly considered in determining if the defendant "copied" the copy-
righted work, but it is not properly considered in determining if copyright pro-
tection existed. See generally Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection
and Representation of Facts, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1569, 1600-02 (1963) (discussing
the copyright protection of analogous business forms as "easy-to-copy-
right/difficult-to-infringe.").
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idea" and thus no infringement was found.112
Courts in two more recent cases have superficially dis-
cussed the copying of a computer program after determining
that copyright protection existed for the computer program. In
Williams Electronics v. Artic International, Inc.,113 after decid-
ing that copyright protection extended to a computer program
stored in a silicon chip,114 the court considered whether Wil-
liams's program had been copied. The plaintiff produced over-
whelming evidence of similarity, including a "buried" copyright
notice in the copy,"U5 the same error in both the original and
the copy,116 and identical locations"17 of 85% of the object
code.18 Without discussing the application of the substantial
similarity test, the court simply held that the expert evidence
of similarities constituted overwhelming evidence of copying.119
Similarly, in Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management
Assistance Inc., 120 after stating that an operating program ex-
pressed in object code constituted a work of authorship and
thus was probably copyrightable,121 the court turned to the de-
termination of whether Hubco copied the program. The court
stated that the Ninth Circuit's "bifurcated" standard 122 con-
trolled, but failed to apply either step of the test to the infringe-
ment issue. Instead, the court studied the expert testimony
concerning Hubco's creation of an exact duplicate of Manage-
ment Assistance's program.123 Hubco had taken Management
Assistance's copyrighted program and either made a written
printout of the object code or stored the program in an internal
computer memory. Then, Hubco located and removed the
112. 462 F. Supp. at 1013.
113. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
114. Id. at 873-75.
115. Id. at 876 n.6. A "buried" copyright notice is stored inside the program
and is never visible to the user when the program is run. When one makes a
duplicate of the chip or floppy, however, the copyright notice is transferred to
the copy with the rest of the program.
116. Id. The error found in both the copyrighted work and the alleged copy
in the Williams case consisted of displaying an incorrect score for destroying a
particular alien in the video game program. Id. n.6.
117. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
118. 685 F.2d at 876 n.6.
119. Id. at 876. Though the defendant on appeal did not dispute the copying
claim in Williams, the court specifically mentioned the similarities used to in-
fer copying.
120. 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,529 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 1983).
121. Id. at 18,105. Because the court was ruling on motions for a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction it merely decided the probability
that the program was copyrightable.
122. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
123. 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) at 18,102.
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"governors,"124 which were designed to provide a pricing mech-
anism for Management Assistance's program.125 Hubco's pur-
pose in removing the governors was to provide extra memory
and peripheral capacity in the computer system for the user
without compensating Management Assistance. Although
never mentioning the ordinary observer standard or the exclu-
sion of expert testimony on the expression question, the court
determined that the duplicative program was probably a copy,
and that Hubco therefore had probably infringed Management
Assistance's copyright.126
Whereas both Williams and Hubco only superficially dis-
cussed the copying issue, the court in Midway Manufacturing
Co. v. Strohon127 considered the question at greater length. Af-
ter holding that copyright protection existed for a program
fixed in object code and stored in a silicon chip,128 the court de-
termined whether the defendant had copied the chips. The
Court, stating that it was applying the modified "abstractions"
test,12 9 first considered whether the defendants had access to
the work, and then whether the expressions of the two works
were substantially similar. 3 0 The defendants could not dispute
that they had access; they contended, however, that the simi-
larities between the two programs did not establish copying.
As presented by the plaintiff, the similarities consisted exclu-
sively of object code contained in silicon chips in the alleged
copy that duplicated the object code contained in the copy-
righted program.' 3 ' Experts testified that, by printing out the
object code from Strohon's silicon chips,132 they determined
124. A "governor" is a device that restricts the operating capacity of the pro-
gram by restricting its ability to compute large quantities of numbers or by re-
ducing its memory capacity. Id.
125. Management Assistance had placed these "governors" on the program
in order to differentiate between purchasers who required different quantities
of storage and operational capacity, even though they purchased the same pro-
gram. Purchasers who required very little storage would purchase programs
with very restrictive governors at relatively low prices. If an extensive amount
of storage were required, purchasers would buy programs with less restrictive
governors. Thus, Management Assistance was able to differentiate among
heavy and light users by price. Hubco thwarted this price discrimination by re-
moving the governors on the program, thus increasing the storage without com-
pensating Management Assistance. Id. at 18,101.
126. Id. at 18,106-07.
127. 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. IlM. 1983).
128. Id. at 752.
129. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
130. 564 F. Supp. at 752.
131. Id. at 752-53. The court did not discuss any similarities other than the
percentage of duplication of object code on the infringement issue. Id.
132. A Microcomputer Development Lab is used to decipher the bits of ob-
1283
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
that 89% of the bytes133 were identical to the plaintiff's bytes.134
From this evidence, the court characterized the degree of simi-
larity as substantial, although not absolute.135 Again, however,
the court failed to adhere to either the ordinary observer stan-
dard or the exclusion of expert testimony,136 both of which
characterize the abstractions test. Thus, beyond merely stating
the access and similarity of expression standards, the Midway
court failed to apply the abstractions test's standards.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF SUBSTANTIAL
SIMILARITY TO COMPUTER PROGRAMS
A. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CouRTs' NONAPPLICATION OF
SUBSTANTIAL S IIA rrY
As the four cases discussed above demonstrate, courts are
reluctant to apply the current forms of the substantial similar-
ity test to determine copying of a copyrighted computer pro-
gram. At least two possible explanations account for this
judicial reluctance: either the courts have found the infringing
nature of the copy so obvious that they view a discussion of
substantial similarity as unnecessary, or the substantial simi-
larity test as presently constructed is simply unworkable in its
application to computer programs.13 7 The first explanation
could account for the court's opinion in Williams, since copying
was essentially admitted by the defendant.138 In Hubco, Mid-
way, and Synercom, however, the defendants contested the
copying question, and the determination of an infringing copy
in each use was not obvious enough to avoid analysis of the is-
sue.13 9 Thus, at least to some degree, the courts must view the
ject code contained in a silicon chip and print the information out as 0's and lPs.
Id. at 752.
133. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
134. Since a byte contains eight locations or bits of object code, an identical
byte would consist of matching O's and l's in each of the eight locations. See id.
at 752.
135. Id. at 753.
136. Not only did the court fail to disregard the expert testimony on the
copying issue, it considered the defendant's failure to present expert evidence
as "glaring and unfortunate." Id. at 749 n.5.
137. A third possibility might be that the courts are simply misapplying the
substantial similarity test. In light of the well-developed case history of the
substantial similarity test and its simple standards, however, this possibility
seems remote.
138. Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876 (3d Cir. 1982).
139. In Hubco the defendant's claim of not copying was extremely tenuous
because the "pirating" work essentially duplicated the copyrighted program;
but the argument apparently was made. Further, the court in Hubco bothered
to state the abstractions test for substantial similarity, thus indicating that it
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substantial similarity test in its present form as unsuitable for
determining whether copyrighted computer programs have
been copied.
B. DEFECTS IN APPLYING THE PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL
SIMILARITY TEST TO COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Were the courts to strictly apply the substantial similarity
test in one of its current forms, two general problems would
arise. First, application of an analysis centered on the "ordi-
nary observer" or "audience" to a computer program, which or-
dinarily is not "observed," would result in an improperly
focused test. Second, application of judicial precedent from the
use of the substantial similarity test on other copyrighted
works might result in overprotection of computer programs,
thereby causing lessened innovation in the software field.
1. The Ordinary Observer Standard is Inapplicable to
Computer Programs.
The ordinary observer analysis that is used in finding sub-
stantial similarity under both the abstractions140 and the Am-
stein'4' test would incorrectly focus the determination of an
infringement action if it were applied to computer programs.
The ordinary observer inquiry was designed to determine gen-
eral aesthetic similarities between the copyrighted work and
the alleged copy.142 For example, the ordinary observer would
view two plays in their entirety to determine whether they are
substantially similar, rather than comparing each line of the
did not find an obvious copy. Hubco Data Prods. v. Management Assistance,
Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,529 at 18, 106.
In Midway, the discussion of copying consumed a significant portion of the
court's opinion. The court characterized the proof of copying in the Midway
case as only substantial, not absolute, thus indicating that the determination
was not obvious enough to avoid application of the substantial similarity test.
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 753 (N.D. Mll. 1983).
Synercom presents the strongest evidence that the courts find the present
forms of the substantial similarity test inapplicable to computer programs. Not
only was the copying issue discussed, but it was decided in favor of the defend-
ant. The plaintiff in Synercom had failed to show that the defendant had cop-
ied the computer program's expression. The court, however, failed to even
mention the substantial similarity standards in determining the distinction be-
tween idea and expression. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Comput-
ing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1012-14 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
140. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
142. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122-23 (2d Cir.
1930); supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
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plays for identical words, phrases, or letters.14 3 Ordinary ob-
servers can make the substantial similarity judgment based on
their background of knowledge as theatergoers. Computer pro-
grams, however, have neither ordinary observers nor an easily
perceived aesthetic appeal. The actual computer program
stored in a silicon chip or floppy is rarely, if ever, seen by the
user. Instead, the computer operator views only the function-
ing and the output of programs, neither of which is protected
by the copyright laws.144 Since there are no ordinary observers
of computer programs, the application of the ordinary observer
standard to judge similarities in computer programs would be
an entirely fictitious process. Compounding this problem is the
absence of an easily perceived general "aura" or "feeling" that
an ordinary observer could judge,145 especially if the program is
fixed in the binary form of object code. A series of O's and l's
arranged in a particular order in a computer program simply
fails to convey a general feeling to an ordinary person. The
only way to obtain a general feeling from a computer program
is to observe the unprotected output and functioning of the pro-
gram. Observing the outward, general similarities, however,
changes the focus of the copyright protection from the underly-
ing program to the product of the program.
The exclusion of expert evidence on the issue of similari-
ties further compounds the problem created by the lack of ob-
servers and the absence of an applicable aesthetic appeal. The
exclusion of expert testimony in noncomputer copyright cases
reflects the desire not to allow minor, technical similarities or
dissimilarities to confuse the ordinary observer's general com-
parative feeling about how the works compare. 46 Because
computer programs possess a general aesthetic feel only from
their functioning and output, however, expert testimony is
143. See Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 19 (9th Cir. 1933).
144. A copyright in a computer program does not protect the output or func-
tioning of the program. A programmer could create a different program that
would produce exactly the same results and output as a copyrighted program
and not infringe the copyright. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 40, at 20-21.
Therefore, one should not merely judge the similarities in the functions or out-
put of computer programs for the purpose of determining infringement.
145. Even the high-level languages lack aesthetic appeal See P. SANDER-
SON, COMPUTER LANGUAGES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE CHIEF PROGRAMMING
LANGUAGES 24 (1970) ("one must not therefore repine if a COBOL program has
not the immediate readability or the aesthetic qualities of a Jane Austen
novel!").
146. Technical dissimilarities are often added to a copied work by a pirate
in an attempt to make it look like an original creation. Thus, the exclusion of
expert testimony in noncomputer copyright cases attempts to prevent a plagia-
rizer from excusing "the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not
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needed to uncover any similarities between the actual pro-
grams. Further, expert evidence is extremely probative of in-
fringement in a computer copyright case, especially if there are
"buried" copyright notices,147 similar errors,14 8 or duplicate
bytes.149 The courts in the four cases discussed above implicitly
recognized this need when they permitted each plaintiff to
present expert evidence of technical similarities.15 0 Formal ap-
plication of either form of the substantial similarity test would
exclude expert evidence15L--and thus would exclude the most
probative evidence of infringement-leaving plaintiffs to rely
pirate." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
The exclusion of expert testimony in proving or disproving substantial sim-
ilarity in noncomputer copyright areas has been criticized by some commenta-
tors. See, e.g., Sorenson & Sorenson, Re-Examining the Traditional Legal Test
of Literary Similarity: A Proposal for Content Analysis, 37 CoRNELL LQ. 638,
646-54 (1952) (arguing for the structured introduction of expert testimony
through "content analysis"); E. KrrcH & H. PERLmAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
COMPETITVE PROCESS 665 (2d ed. 1979) (arguing that when the alleged copy is
not an exact duplicate of the copyrighted work, a close analysis of specific dif-
ferences and similarities is required). While expert evidence has been allowed
to show similarities in actions involving infringement of musical compositions,
see Wilkie v. Santly Bros., 91 F.2d 978, 979 (2d Cir. 1937); Arnstein v. ASCAP, 29
F. Supp. 388, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), it has been excluded in almost all other copy-
right areas, see, e.g., O'Neill v. Dell Publishing Co., 630 F.2d 685, 690 (1st Cir.
1980) (novels); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 138
(D.N.J. 1982) (video games). See generally Comment, Copyright Protection for
Mass-Produced Commercial Products: A Review of the Developments Follow-
ing Mazer v. Stein, 38 U. CmI. L. REV. 807, 813 (1971).
147. A "buried" copyright notice is almost conclusive evidence of copying
because the notice would be extremely unlikely to appear in an independently
created work. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876 n.6
(3d Cir. 1982).
148. Similar errors in noncomputer copyright cases can in some cases sat-
isfy even the striking similarity standard. See Testa v. Janssen, 492 F. Supp.
198, 203 (W.D. Pa. 1980); cf. Knickerbocker Toy Co., v. Buddy L. Corp., 547 F.
Supp. 35, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (a similar error in the marketing package is of par-
ticular importance in establishing substantial similarity to the copyrighted mar-
keting package).
149. Duplicate bytes, although not conclusive evidence because there may
be only a limited number of ways to program a function, are a strong indication
of literal copying. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 752-53
(N.D. Ill. 1983).
150. The Hubco court allowed expert evidence concerning the creation of a
copy inside the computer's memory by the defendant. Hubco Data Prods.
Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 2 COPYRIGHT L REP. (CCH) 25,529, at
18,102. The Synercom court allowed expert evidence concerning the process of
reverse engineering a compatible input statement. Synercom Technology, Inc.
v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1012 (N.D. Tex 1978). The Wil-
liams court allowed expert evidence of a buried copyright notice, duplicate ob-
ject code, and identical errors. 685 F.2d at 876 n.6. Finally, the Midway court
allowed expert testimony of duplicate bytes. 564 F. Supp. at 752-53.
151. The Arnstein test would allow the evidence, but only for showing that
the defendant used the copyrighted work, not for the purpose of showing simi-
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merely on the factfinder's intuitive assessment of the general
similarities between the programs.
The effect of the ordinary observer standard and its exclu-
sion of expert evidence can be seen more clearly by examining
a hypothetical infringement action. Suppose, as in Williams,
that a copyright holder in a mass-marketed program offered ex-
pert evidence that the defendant's silicon chips duplicated 80%
of the object code from the copyrighted program and that the
alleged copy contained a hidden copyright notice from the
copyrighted program. Under the "abstractions" test, since ac-
cess is satisfied,152 the inquiry turns on whether an ordinary
observer would regard the programs as similar without the use
of expert testimony.153 Excluding the expert testimony pre-
vents the plaintiff from showing the technical similarities such
as the hidden copyright notice. The factfinder must try to ob-
tain an intuitive sense of similarity between the programs
based on any nonexpert evidence the plaintiff can provide.
With the Arnstein test, although the plaintiff could show that
the defendant "used" the copyrighted work in preparing the
copy, 5 4 the same ordinary observer standard precludes expert
testimony on the question of appropriation of the work's ex-
pression.155 Though infringement in this example may eventu-
ally be found based on the outward evidence of similar
functions and outputs, the best evidence of copying, the buried
copyright notice, would never be considered by the factfinder.
Further, the factfinder would be confused by attempting to
judge the similarities from the perspective of a nonexistent ob-
server. Thus, the present forms of the substantial similarity
test provide poor frameworks within which to measure similari-
ties in computer programs.
2. Overprotection of the Copyrighted Program.
Application of the present forms of the substantial similar-
ity test to computer programs may also lead to overprotection
of the copyright owner's interests to the detriment of innova-
larities in the expressions of the two works. See supra notes 95-97 and accom-
panying text.
152. Because the program is mass-marketed, the defendant would almost
certainly have the opportunity to view the work. See supra note 88 and accom-
panying text.
153. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
154. The duplicate copyright notice would indicate that the defendant had
used or "copied" the copyrighted work in some manner, thus satisfying the first
step of the Arnstein test. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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tion. Paradoxically, while the use of the ordinary observer
standard results in preventing a plaintiff from presenting the
evidence most probative of infringement in literal copying156
cases, the expansive view of expression under the substantial
similarity test would result in increased, and perhaps overly
broad, protection in nonliteral copying cases. 157
In noncomputer copyright cases, the copyright laws are in-
terpreted to protect more than the literal arrangement of the
program's statements from copying. Outside the computer pro-
gram context, "expression" denotes not only the literal ar-
rangement of words, sounds or numbers, but also the "pattern"
of the work, or "the sequence of events and the development of
the interplay of the characters."158 By copying this pattern of a
copyrighted work, an individual has infringed the copyright.
Thus, if one creates a television commercial with characters
and costumes similar to a copyrighted TV show's characters,
even though they act differently, the copyright is still
infringed.' 5 9
Though the broad scope of the term expression, and the
consequent broad scope of protection, are useful in noncom-
puter copyright areas, such may not be the case in the com-
puter field. With many aesthetic works, a "pirate" can simply
listen, read, or observe the copyrighted work and relatively eas-
fly produce a comprehensive nonliteral copy by using slightly
different words or actions to express the same idea.16o The in-
fringer can thus accomplish the purpose of "pirating," captur-
ing the economic market of the copyrighted work at minimal
cost, without making a literal copy. Computer programs, how-
ever, involve exact instructions with each statement precisely
linking with other statements to produce a functional pro-
156. Literal copying consists of reproducing the copyrighted work word for
word. Nimmer classifies copyright infringement cases as either comprehensive
nonliteral copying or fragmented literal copying. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note
36, at § 13.03[A] [1], [2].
157. Nonliteral copying, or as Nimmer calls it, comprehensive nonliteral
copying, changes the words used in the copyrighted work but maintains the
"fundamental essence or structure." Id. at § 13.03[A] [1].
158. Chafee, supra note 71, at 514. This is essentially the same as Nimmer's
comprehensive nonliteral copying. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 36, at
§ 13.03[A] [1].
159. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (McDonaldland infringed the copyright in H.R. Pufnstuf).
160. For example, one could take an author's book and by using a thesaurus
change most of the words while keeping the same ideas and produce a reason-
able substitute. Undoubtedly, the "pirate" would have invested far less work in
producing the nonliteral copy than the original author.
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gram.161 While one could change the noncritical parts of a
source code program, such as the numbers for each program
statement162 or the names of any variables,163 changing the op-
erative statements would require precise replacements and the
investment of substantial knowledge and time by the pirate.
One cannot simply "approximate" the entire copyrighted com-
puter program and create a similar operative program without
the expenditure of almost the same amount of time as the origi-
nal programmer expended.164 If one approximated the copy-
righted program solely for the purpose of reproducing it, the
added time would substantially reduce the incentives, espe-
cially in the fast-moving software industry.165 Creating a non-
literal copy of a computer program in object code, which is the
form of almost all mass-marketed programs,166 is even more
161. See J. O'BRIEN, supra note 10, at 227-28. (Program coding "involves a
rigorous process which requires the computer programmer to strictly follow
specific rules concerning format and syntax."). Errors as simple as a misplaced
punctuation mark in a computer program can result in the program not operat-
ing correctly. Id. at 231; see also Davidson, supra note 32, at 377 ("A computer
is very literal minded and the instructions in the manual translation must be
very precise in order to work.").
162. Each statement in a source code program may be numbered; but the
numbers serve only a nominal purpose. A "pirate" could simply change the
numbers by keeping them in numerical order but counting by twos.
163. Each variable is given a name in the program. The names have no in-
dependent meaning to the computer beyond identifying the variable and so
could be changed by the pirate without changing the program's operation.
164. See Keplinger, supra note 8, at 487 (Especially in microcomputer pro-
grams, "there is a significant investment in the coding, testing, and debugging
of the program rather than in the underlying algorithm or process."). One com-
mentator argues that a programmer can in a matter of days cosmetically
change a source code program to make it look completely different from the
original copyrighted program. Davidson, supra note 32, at 378. But the exam-
ples the commentator provides of cosmetic changes to a program consist of se-
lecting different dimensions for variables and incorporating data tables into the
program. Id. The critical parts of the program (i.e., the actual operating func-
tions), however, would still be identical to the copyrighted work, even with
these cosmetic changes. Thus, evidence of a literal reproduction would still ap-
pear in the "pirating" work. To change these underlying processes of the copy-
righted program would require much more time than a few days and require
significant amounts of technical skill from the pirate.
165. See D. REMER, supra note 31, at 20 (the computer industry "moves too
fast to be satisfied with old ideas"). Programmers who use copyrighted pro-
grams solely to reproduce their functions must be distinguished from program-
mers who use the copyrighted program as a basis for further improvements or
innovation. The former category is discouraged from making nonliteral copies
of computer programs by the long development period required, while the lat-
ter category, as a policy matter, will not be as discouraged since they, by defini-
tion, have a stake in producing new and improved works. Further, the latter
category, as a policy matter, should not be discouraged from using the copy-
righted program. See infra notes 169-77 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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difficult and time-consuming than source code copying since
one has to decompile the program back to a type of source code
before examining its individual statements and replacing
them.167 Instead of proceeding through this elaborate and
time-consuming process, a computer program pirate is much
more likely to literally copy or mechanically translate the copy-
righted program and perhaps make some minor, noncritical
changes to the literal duplication.168 Thus, the threat of a com-
puter software pirate evading the copyright law's prohibition
against copying by making a comprehensive nonliteral copy is
much less than in other media.
Even though creating comprehensive nonliteral copies of
computer programs is unlikely because of the significant ex-
penditure of time and knowledge required, one might view the
broad protection against nonliteral copying as a useful safety
net for protecting the programmer's investment in the copy-
righted program. In the computer program area, however, more
so than in other copyright areas, the increased protection from
the broad substantial similarity test results in the unfortunate
side effect of lessened innovation. The balance between protec-
tionism and dissemination underlying the policy of copyright
law becomes skewed too far toward protection, with a resultant
decrease in software innovation. To understand the reasons for
the lessened innovation, one must first comprehend the pro-
cess of technological growth in the computer software field.
The computer software industry progresses by a stepping-
stone improvement process, with each innovation building on
past innovations to produce an improved product.169 Although
it appears to be the result of quantum leaps, the development
of computer software has actually been "founded on a succes-
sion of seemingly minor improvements on existing tech-
167. See D. REmER, supra note 31, at 20. Even Mr. Davidson agrees that any-
thing but "slavish" copying of programs expressed in object code is extremely
difficult. See Davidson, supra note 32, at 380.
168. See Selinger, Protecting Computer Software in the Business Environ-
ment: Patents, Copyrights and Trade Secrets, 3 COMUTER TJ. 65, 75 (1983)
(many copyists do not even attempt to make any changes to the copied pro-
gram). See also Davidson, supra note 32, at 377 ('much of the concern in the
software industry is against exact copiers").
Though literal copying, with minor changes, will usually be the only feasi-
ble way for a pirate to benefit economically from a copyrighted program, this
process is also much easier to detect because it will result in duplication of
many of the original bytes and any hidden copyright notices.
169. As the old saying goes, "A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant
can see farther than the giant himself." Chafee, supra note 71, at 511.
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niques.' 7 0 Whereas only a few programmers have the
capability to create totally new methods of operations, there
are many programmers who can mimic the pioneers and add
improvements.171 Cumulatively, the minor innovations pro-
duce technological growth of major significance. 7 2
Unlike most other fields of endeavor covered by the copy-
right laws, the imitation and stepping-stone progress in com-
puter programs requires plagiarizing in some manner the
underlying copyrighted work. 7 3 Computer programs are fun-
damentally different from most other literary works that pro-
duce technological growth in that the program itself both
expresses the innovation and performs the new operation. For
example, a book detailing a new heart transplant procedure
conveys the idea of the procedure for other doctors to use in
their operations. The book, however, does not perform the op-
eration. A computer program, on the other hand, both conveys
a new innovation or process and also carries out the operation.
A new operating system for a microcomputer details the input
and output formats necessary for compatibility with the
microcomputer, and also performs the operating functions.
While this might seem to be a minor distinction, it is of critical
importance to copyright protection. In the heart transplant ex-
ample, innovation can occur by another doctor reading the
copyrighted book, modifying the technique in some small way,
and performing the modified procedure without ever worrying
about a copyright infringement action. In fact, the second doc-
tor could publish the modified technique in a new book without
infringing the original work's copyright. 7 4 With the new com-
170. See D. SAHAL, PATTERNS OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 180-81 (1981).
171. Id. at 77.
172. Id. at 37 ("Indeed, the bulk of technical progress is very often attributa-
ble to modifications of a given technique.").
173. Other works that are similar to the computer programs in this regard
include maps, directories, and business forms (also known as "fact" works).
The author of a fact work draws upon objective data set in a particular expres-
sion and compiles the data for publication. Because the ideas in a "fact" work
are already set in a particular expression, a more limited definition of infringe-
ment is advocated. See Gorman, supra note 111, at 1570-71.
It can be argued that computer programs are analogous to "fact" works.
The first computer programmer, especially for an operating program, details
the necessary steps for input, processing, and output with the computer, which
is comparable to accumulating the necessary information for a business form.
Subsequent programmers then build on these ideas to create innovative works.
Certainly, both with computer programs and "fact" works, the innovator could
start from the beginning and recreate the original work, that process, however,
would be duplicative and wasteful of society's resources.
174. The second doctor would only be prohibited from using the first doc-
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puter operating program, however, one cannot slightly modify
the copyrighted program's procedure without first recreating in
some manner the original program's expression. A new innova-
tor must therefore plagiarize and apply much of the original op-
erating system to the new "fixed" computer program in order to
add a new improvement.
The increased protection against nonliteral uses of a copy-
righted work that would result from application of the broad
substantial similarity test may prohibit much of this cumula-
tive innovation and "second-sourcing." 7 5 By preventing the in-
novator from producing a new program encompassing the
patterns of the original copyrighted program, the stepping-
stone innovation cannot occur. Even if an innovator changed
every statement in a copyrighted program, the nonliteral "pat-
terns" or aesthetic qualities still may be similar between the
copyrighted work and the new work, and infringement could be
found under the present forms of the substantial similarity
test. The only reasonably safe manner to produce a program
accomplishing the same purposes as a copyrighted program is
to avoid any access to the copyrighted work. 7 6 In effect, the
programmer would have to "reinvent the wheel" in order to
produce an innovation that furthers technological progress. 77
The effect of applying the present forms of the substantial simi-
larity test to computer programs, therefore, would be to lessen
innovation in the software field.
tor's expression, not the underlying ideas contained in the copyrighted work.
See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
175. Second-sourcing refers to the production of an alternative software sys-
tem by an independent programmer for a specified manufacturer's computer
hardware. See A. CHANDOR, supra note 15, at 159.
176. Theoretically, if one does not view the underlying computer program,
there is no possibility of infringing the copyright in the computer program.
But, since the definition of access is merely the opportunity to view, see supra
note 88 and accompanying text, even if a programmer does not actually view
the copyrighted program, the access requirement could still be met. Further, in
many instances, two independently written programs for the same computer, in
the same language, and performing the same general functions will look sub-
stantially similar. Davidson, supra note 32, at 377. Since the substantial simi-
larity test would then be met, the defendant would then have the burden of
persuasion to show that the work was independently created. Showing that the
alleged "pirate" did not view a particular program would be a difficult task.
Thus, even the programmer of an independently created program could lose a
copyright infringement suit.
177. A programmer may be able to view the operating manuals or the pro-
gram description of the copyrighted program, if they are available. See Com-
ment, Copyright Protection for Programs Stored in Computer Chips: Competing
with IBM and Apple, 7 HAmLi'E L. REV. 103, 125-27 (1984). Even the program
descriptions, however, may be protected from use in preparing a copy of the
program by the the copyright laws. See Davidson, supra note 32, at 379-80.
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Another hypothetical will help illustrate the overprotection
problem. Suppose a programmer were to dissect a copyrighted
mass-marketed operating program and write a new program
that accomplished the same purpose, yet improved many as-
pects of the original program. Applying the abstractions test
reveals that the access requirement is met by the mass-mar-
keted nature of the program. 7 8 The analysis then turns on the
ordinary observer's judgment of the similarities between the
expressions of the two works without expert testimony. 7 9 The
owner of the copyrighted program could provide evidence that
the defendant's reverse engineered program accomplished the
same functions, ran on the same computer, and contained simi-
lar input formats as the copyrighted program.180 Certainly the
general patterns of the two works, their sequences of events
and processes, resemble each other to a large degree. To that
extent, the reverse engineered program could be characterized
as substantially similar to, and thus infringing, the copyrighted
program.'18 Under the Arnstein test, after finding access to and
use of the copyrighted work,182 the factfinder could find similar-
ity in expression since the second stage of the Arnstein test is
identical to the abstractions test.183 The Synercom court's com-
ment that the addition of creative effort in a technological field
should remove the alleged "pirate" from the realm of infringing
reproductions184 provides little comfort from the possibility
that either version of the substantial similarity test could char-
acterize the program as infringing the copyright.
V. ALTERNATIVE "ITERATIVE" APPROACH TO
SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY OF COMPUTER
PROGRAMS
The courts have avoided the inherent problems of applying
either version of the substantial similarity test to computer pro-
178. Again, the mass-marketed nature of the software practically guaran-
tees the opportunity to view the copyrighted work. See supra note 88 and ac-
companying text.
179. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 106-08 and accompanying text.
181. Obviously, given that the ordinary observer test is inapplicable to com-
puter programs, it is difficult to state precisely whether infringement would be
found.
182. Use of the copyrighted work could be shown by the defendant's view-
ing of the program and attempt to simulate the program.
183. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
184. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp.
1003, 1013-14 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
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grams by simply not applying the test.185 While avoiding the
problems, the courts have left the state of the law unclear by
failing to articulate their reasons for not applying the test and
by failing to propose a new standard for use in computer copy-
right infringement cases.186 Thus, the primary goal of the "iter-
ative" approach proposed here is to produce a system for
proper analysis of similarities between computer programs and
to yield predictable results.
Only relatively minor modifications are necessary to cor-
rect the deficiencies in the current forms of the substantial sim-
ilarity test. By eliminating the ordinary observer standard
from the Arnstein test and reformulating the idea/expression
distinction, an "iterative" 8 7 substantial similarity test can be
developed. Under the "iterative" test, a plaintiff would estab-
lish a prima facie case of copyright infringement of a computer
program by showing: (1) that the defendant used the copy-
righted work in preparing the alleged copy by offering evidence
of access and similarities between the two works, and (2) that
the defendant's work is an "iterative" reproduction that is, a re-
statement in substantially the same form, such as a literal copy
or translation, of a substantial portion' 88 of the copyrighted pro-
gram. Once the plaintiff has shown an iterative reproduction,
the burden shifts to the defendant to show independent crea-
tion' 89 or fair use.190
185. See supra notes 105-36 and accompanying text.
186. This Note does not argue with the results reached by any of the four
courts, but rather takes exception to the confusion caused by the courts' lack of
clarity. In fact, the use of the iterative test as proposed here would probably
not change the results of Synercom, Williams, Hubco, or Midway.
187. See supra note 6.
188. Under the present forms of the substantial similarity test, a taking of a
copyrighted work must not be trivial nor insubstantial in order to be infringing.
But as slight an appropriation as literal duplication of three lines of text may
constitute a nontrivial taking depending on the nature of the matter appropri-
ated and the length of the copyrighted work. Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & My-
ers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (taking of three lines held
to infringe the copyright). Thus, to determine whether a taking is nontrivial,
one should consider both quantitative and qualitative evidence regarding the
material appropriated.
189. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
190. Even if the evidence is sufficient to meet the "iterative" test, infringe-
ment of the copyright would not be found if the copying was "fair use" of the
copyrighted work. See generally Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345, 1350-63 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (discussing the "fair use" doctrine both gener-
ally and specifically in the context of photocopying of articles in medical jour-
nals by a library for use by a governmental research organization), aFfd per
curiam by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 U.S. 376. Fair use is an equi-
table doctrine that was created by the courts, see University City Studios, Inc.
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A. DESCRIPTION OF THE ITERATIVE SUBSTANTIAL SIMLARITY
TEST
The first step of the test, defendant's use of the copyrighted
work, is essentially the same as the first step of the Arnstein
approach.X91 Both the defendant's access to the copyrighted
work and similarities between the two works can be offered to
establish use of the copyrighted work. If the copyrighted pro-
gram were marketed to the general public, access to the work
would be almost indisputable because the defendant would
have had the opportunity to view the work.192 The trier of fact
in such a case would only need to find sufficient similarities to
"reasonably infer" use of the copyrighted work. Either general
similarities, such as similar functions, methods, and outputs, or
specific similarities, such as buried copyright notices or dupli-
cate bytes could be used by the plaintiff to establish the de-
fendant's use of the copyrighted work. As under the Arnstein
approach, the trier of fact would weigh the evidence according
to its probative value in establishing defendant's use of the
work, not by the effect on the ordinary observer. If access to
the copyrighted work cannot be established, however, the
plaintiff could still establish use by showing that the works are
"so strikingly similar as to preclude the possibility of independ-
ent creation."' 93 Under this striking similarity test, the fact-
finder views the same evidence as it would under the substan-
tial similarity standard but the plaintiff is required to meet a
higher standard of proof.194
Assuming that the "use" requirement is satisfied, the fact-
finder must then determine whether the use constitutes an "it-
erative" reproduction. This "iterative" determination accounts
for the differences between computer programs and other copy-
righted works by reformulating the idea/expression distinction
of the substantial similarity test in two ways. First, the test
changes the focus of the idea/expression inquiry from the ef-
fect of similarities on the "ordinary observer" to the existence
or nonexistence of a certain fact as determined by the fact-
v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct.
774 (1984), and is embodied in the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
191. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
193. Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978);
see also 3 M. Nu .ER, supra note 36, at § 13.02[B]. The striking similarity stan-
dard is also explicitly mentioned by the Arnstein court, which implied that if
access is not shown, a higher standard of similarities is required. 154 F.2d at
468.
194. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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finder.l9 5 The question for the factfinder is whether it is more
probable than not' 96 that the defendant created an iterative re-
production of a substantial part of the copyrighted work. In de-
termining this question, the factfinder must observe specific
similarities or differences that establish or refute iterative
copying, rather than attempt to achieve an intuitive sense of
the degree of similarity between the programs. In addition, ex-
pert testimony should be encouraged from both the plaintiff
and the defendant regarding the defendant's "iterative" use of
the copyrighted program. The plaintiff should not only provide
expert evidence of specific similarities, but also present some
evidence linking these similarities to the probability that the
defendant made a literal reproduction or translation.197
Second, and more important, the iterative standard clarifies
the distinction between the "ideas" and "expression" of a com-
puter program and restricts the definition of "expression" in
195. The abandonment of the ordinary observer standard for judging simi-
larities in copyright infringement cases is not unprecedented. Nathan Burkan
once successfully argued that the court must "have a more Olympian viewpoint
than the average playgoer" to judge an infringement action. Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 7 F. Supp. 837, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), rev'd, 81 F.2d 49 (2d
Cir.). In fact, the substantial similarity test in practice "is much modified; its
contours depend on the subject matter of the copyright and a number of other
factors." Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. 124, 131 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
Thus, creating a modified version of the substantial similarity test exclusively
for computer programs would not be a novel development for the judiciary in
the copyright area.
The change from an ordinary observer analysis to a question of fact as de-
termined by the factfinder resembles somewhat the movement from negligence
to strict liability in tort. In both instances a fictitious person standard is re-
placed by a determination of a certain factual event. As one court stated in a
strict liability tort case:
[W]e reject standards based upon what the "reasonable" con-
sumer could be expected to know, or what the "reasonable" manufac-
turer could be expected to "foresee" about the consumers who use his
product.... Rather, the sole question here is whether the seller ac-
companied his product with sufficient instructions and warnings so as
to make his product safe.
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 101, 337 A.2d 893, 902 (1975).
Likewise, under this Note's proposal for the copyright area, the question
whether the alleged copy is an iterative reproduction (a factual question) re-
places the question whether the ordinary observer regarded the alleged copy as
substantially similar.
196. Of course, the standard depends on the particular procedural posture
of the legal action. In a preliminary injunction action, the plaintiff is required
to show only a reasonable probability of success on the merits. Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245-46 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
197. For example, expert evidence regarding the number of possible differ-
ent ways to program a compatible input format would be helpful in deciding
whether 50% similarity in object code between two programs constitutes formi-
dable evidence of "iterative" copying.
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the context of computer programs.198 Only translations, such
as creating an object code copy of a source code program by
use of an assembler or compiler,199 and literal restatements of
the program would constitute infringement under the iterative
test. This does not mean that a pirate could avoid the copyright
laws by cosmetically changing one small part of a copyrighted
program and reproducing the rest. Rather, the plaintiff must
only show an iterative reproduction of a substantial portion of
the copyrighted work. Thus, mere cosmetic changes would not
render the "pirating" program noninfringing since a substantial
part of the copyrighted program would still be translated or lit-
erally copied. The determination of whether an alleged copy
constitutes an iterative reproduction of a substantial portion of
a copyrighted program should be made by examining both
quantitative and qualitative evidence of similarities. Quantita-
tive evidence could consist of showing the percentage of bytes
in the copyrighted program that were duplicated in the alleged
copy. Qualitative evidence could consist of expert testimony
regarding the meaning of the quantitative similarities in light of
the functions the program serves. For example, for purposes of
determining iterative copying, duplication of the input formats
of a copyrighted program is of less significance than duplication
of the operating procedures of the program.20 0
Obviously, the iterative standard does not produce a final
resolution of the idea/expression distinction. Under the itera-
tive standard, the factfinder still must determine whether the
evidence demonstrates a restatement in substantially the same
198. A restricted definition of expression has been applied in other copy-
right areas. For example, a copyrighted biography of a famous person is not
infringed by another biography that portrays the same events and relies heav-
ily upon the copyrighted work. Rosemount Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). A more
general distinction is made in Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. 124,
131 (E.D. Mich. 1979), between works of a commercial and useful character on
one hand and literary works on the other hand. The Kepner-Tregoe court
stated: "Two useful works might bear resemblance that would show infringe-
ment if literary, but which is not because they are technical. The 'substantial
similarity' test is modified." Id. Thus, creating a new, restricted definition of
substantial similarity for computer programs would not be an unprecedented
occurrence in copyrighted law. The Kepner-Tregoe court views this as 'thin"
copyright protection. Id. at 130-31.
199. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
200. The input formats are not as substantial a part of the computer pro-
gram as are the total operations of the program. Further, certain input formats
may be required by the computer in its operation. Thus, 100% duplication of
the input formats probably would not be considered an iterative copy of a sub-
stantial part of the copyrighted program, whereas 70% duplication of the oper-
ating program's bytes could indicate an iterative reproduction.
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form of a substantial portion of the copyrighted program. The
continuum between the idea of the computer program and its
expression still is present.20 1 Focusing on the literal similari-
ties between the two works and their significance in the alleged
pirate's program, however, will yield a more clearly defined and
ascertainable distinction between the idea and its expression.
B. THE CHANGES AND EFFECTS OF THE ITERATIVE SUBSTANTIAL
SIMILARITY TEST
The differences between the iterative standard and the
present forms of the substantial similarity test become clearer
by reexamining the two hypothetical computer infringement
problems previously discussed. In the first hypothetical, where
80% of the object code was duplicated and a buried copyright
notice appeared in the alleged copy,202 iterative copying would
be found. The plaintiff could clearly demonstrate access; 20 3 and
the buried copyright notice alone provides a reasonable infer-
ence that the defendant used the copyrighted work in prepar-
ing the alleged copy.204 Proceeding to the second, "iterative"
inquiry, both the expert's testimony that 80% of the entire pro-
gram's object code is duplicated in the copy (supplemented by
an explanation of the alternative ways to produce a program
with the same functions) and the buried copyright notice pro-
vide overwhelming evidence that the defendant made a literal
reproduction of a substantial portion of the copyrighted pro-
gram, thus establishing iterative copying.205 Therefore, in con-
trast to the exclusion of expert testimony under the present
substantial similarity tests,206 the plaintiff could satisfy both
201. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. The progression from
idea to expression in computer programs can be expressed linearly as follows:
EXPRESSION ' ) IDEA
Literal Mechanical Cosmetic Structural Reverse Independent
Copy Translation Changes Changes Engineered Creation
The iterative test attempts to draw a line between cosmetic changes to a literal
copy and structural changes in the use of a copyrighted work. Obviously, a fine
line cannot be drawn; however, a better definition of an infringing reproduction
and a more structured analysis of the infringement question can result from
using the iterative approach.
202. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
203. This is a mass-marketed program, thus giving the opportunity to copy,
and thereby satisfying the access requirement. See supra note 88 and accom-
panying text.
204. See supra note 147.
205. In other words, it is more probable than not that the defendant created
a literal reproduction of the copyrighted work.
206. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
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steps of the iterative approach, and thus prove infringement,
with the relevant expert testimony.
Returning to the second hypothetical,207 where a program-
mer reverse engineered a program similar to a copyrighted pro-
gram,20 8 the iterative standard would not allow a finding of
infringement. While the similar input formats 209 and program
functions probably demonstrate use of the copyrighted pro-
gram by the defendant and thus satisfy the first step,2 10 the evi-
dence falls short of meeting the iterative copying requirement.
A reasonable factfinder could not find that the defendant liter-
ally reproduced any part of the copyrighted work simply be-
cause the alleged copy generally resembled and served the
same purpose as the copyrighted program. Some type of spe-
cific evidence regarding similarities in the form of the pro-
grams, such as duplicate commands, object code, and similar
errors, would be necessary for a finding of iterative reproduc-
tion. Thus, unlike the present substantial similarity standards,
the iterative approach would classify the reverse engineered
program as a noninfringing use of the copyrighted program.
By using the iterative standard, courts would avoid both of
the problems resulting from application of the "abstractions"
and Arnstein forms of the substantial similarity test to com-
puter programs. 2 11 As is obvious from the hypotheticals, the it-
erative approach eliminates the ordinary observer standard
and allows the use of expert testimony to show similarities of
expression. The new test substitutes an objective factual deter-
mination for the intuitive decision of the ordinary observer.
The trier of fact focuses on finding the existence of iterative
copying as it would view any other factual issue in a copyright
infringement trial. The iterative standard also recognizes the
need for expert testimony to show similarities. By allowing ex-
pert testimony and focusing on specific similarities, the itera-
tive test produces a more applicable and realistic standard to
judge similarities between computer programs.
The "iterative" substantial similarity test also adjusts the
idea/expression distinction to allow more cumulative innova-
207. See supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 108.
209. See upra note 107.
210. The defendant viewed the copyrighted work and based his or her pro-
gram on that work, thus meeting the first step of the "iterative" test.
211. As discussed earlier, see supra notes 140-84 and accompanying text, ap-
plication of the substantial similarity test to computer programs is inappropri-
ate because computer programs lack ordinary observers or audiences and
because it would result in overprotection of copyrighted computer programs.
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tion and thereby foster advancement in the computer software
field. By focusing on the literal similarities in copyrighted pro-
grams, the test allows reverse engineering2 12 and second sourc-
ing2 13 of copyrighted programs. A programmer may plagiarize
a computer program to produce an innovation as long as he or
she does not literally reproduce a significant portion of the
copyrighted work. Further, since only copying of a significant
portion of the copyrighted program is prohibited, literal dupli-
cation of the input formats of a copyrighted program would in
many cases be noninfringing. The iterative approach allows
programmers to use the copyrighted work to a greater extent
than do the present forms of the substantial similarity test.
Thus, the iterative test promotes dissemination of the copy-
righted work's ideas and advances the policy of the copyright
laws to promote progress. 2 14
The iterative test also retains the basic protection neces-
sary to achieve the incentive to create new software.215 The
test clearly prohibits literal reproductions of copyrighted pro-
grams, thus providing protection against slavish copying. And
since reverse engineering or second sourcing of a copyrighted
program takes considerable time,21 6 the copyright holder would
have a significant time advantage over any imitators of the pro-
gram. With computer software progressing so rapidly that pro-
grams become obsolete within months of their development,2 17
the copyright holder's time advantage would appear sufficient
to provide the necessary incentives to create. Indeed, in the
1960s the total lack of proprietary protection for mathematical
programming was credited with producing harder work, new in-
212. See supra note 108.
213. See supra note 175.
214. Some courts have implied that the promotion of progress by cumula-
tive innovation of copyrighted works is not an appropriate policy of the copy-
right laws. See, e.g., Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664, 666-67 (7th
Cir. 1950). Yet, one commentator has saic
It is unreasonable to say, as some courts have, that the copyright
act bars one person from saving labor and time by using the works of
another. On the contrary, avoidance of wasteful duplication of effort is
one of the policies underlying the law of copyright.
Gorman, supra note 111, at 1604 (footnotes omitted).
215. Recall that the copyright laws are designed to give only a limited mo-
nopoly to the author in order to encourage new works. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 161-75 and accompanying text.
217. One commentator suggests that computer software progresses so fast
that "any program which is running is obsolete." Kellam, The Future of Com-
puting: Personal with a Capital P, PERSONAL COMPUTING, May 1983, at 211, 214.
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novations, and rapid dissemination of the improvements. 218
Certainly in the 1980s computer programs should be given
some proprietary protection. The scope, however, of the protec-
tion should be balanced with the need for disseminating infor-
mation in order to advance the computer field. The iterative
test provides a reasonable approach to balancing the interests
of the programmer with the needs of society.
CONCLUSION
Copyright protection of computer programs has recently
expanded in scope. Consequently, infringement actions have
become more prevalent and courts have become confused
about the appropriate standard of analysis to apply in deter-
mining infringement. The substantial similarity test under
either the "abstractions" or the Arnstein approach provides a
poor framework to judge similarities and would lead to stifling
innovations of programs if it were applied. An iterative stan-
dard of substantial similarity has been suggested by this Note
to correct these problems. The iterative test changes the cur-
rent forms of the substantial similarity test with a factual de-
termination of whether the alleged copy is a restatement in
substantially the same form of a substantial portion of the
copyrighted program. By refocusing the inquiry, the iterative
test provides a clearer standard to judge infringement of copy-
righted computer programs, and furthers the policies of copy-
right law by promoting dissemination of ideas resulting in more
cumulative innovation. Thus, while no test will completely
solve the problem that Learned Hand described as unsolv-
able,219 the iterative approach improves upon the present con-
fusion and provides a better alternative.
Howard Root
218. Douglas, The Software Business, in SOFTWARE PROTECTION: THE LEGAL
PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS 5, 10 (1969).
219. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
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